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Abstract
Background: Decisions under risk and with outcomes that are delayed in time are ubiquitous in real life and can
have a significant impact on the health and wealth of the decision-maker. Despite its potential relevance for real-
world choices, the degree of aberrant risky and intertemporal decision-making in patients suffering from major
depressive disorder (MDD) and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has received little attention to date.
Method: We used a case-control design to compare decision-making in healthy control subjects (N=16) versus
untreated depressed subjects in a current major depressive episode (N=20). In order to examine how major
depressive disorder (MDD) may impact decision-making, subjects made decisions over (1) risky outcomes and (2)
delayed outcomes in the domain of gains and losses using choice paradigms from neuroeconomics. In a pre-planned
analysis, depressed subjects were subdivided into those with primary PTSD along with comorbid MDD (MDD+PTSD)
versus those with primary MDD without PTSD (MDD-only). Choice behavior was modeled via a standard
econometric model of intertemporal choice, a quasi-hyperbolic temporal discounting function, which was estimated
for each subject group separately.
Results: Under conditions of potential gain, depressed subjects demonstrated greater discounting for gains across
all time frames compared to controls. In the realm of losses, both subgroups of depressed subjects discounted more
steeply than controls for short time frames. However, for delayed losses ranging from >1-10 years, MDD+PTSD
subjects showed shallower discounting rates relative to MDD-only subjects, who continued to discount future losses
steeply. Risk attitudes did not contribute to differences in intertemporal choice.
Conclusions: Depressed patients make choices that minimize current pain and maximize current reward, despite
severe later consequences or lost opportunities. Anxiety associated with PTSD may serve as a partially protective
factor in decision-making about long-term potential losses compared to MDD patients without PTSD.
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Introduction
Major depressive disorder (MDD) is a chronic and debilitating
disease with a lifetime prevalence of 13-17% [1,2]. In addition
to sad mood and loss of interest in activities, MDD is frequently
associated with pessimism about future possibilities and
reduced sensitivity to rewards [3,4].
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) affects 2-7% of the
population [1,2]. PTSD is classified in DSM-IV as an anxiety
disorder that shares considerable symptom overlap with MDD,
including insomnia, loss of interests, and concentration
impairments. MDD frequently co-occurs in patients with PTSD,
leading some to question whether PTSD is truly a distinct
illness [5], though others find support for the current DSM-IV
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classification [6,7]. Among the features of PTSD that
distinguish it from MDD are distress from, and avoidance of,
reminders of the traumatic event, hyper-vigilance for threat,
and a foreshortened sense of one’s future [8].
An important but understudied clinical issue for patients
suffering from depression is decision-making behavior.
Depressed patients often make choices that are not in their
best interest, such as neglect of social relationships, reacting
passively to potential defeats, and failing to pursue new
opportunities [9.10]. Such choices can serve to continue or
intensify the external circumstances that act to reinforce the
negative mood state. Furthermore, depressed patients may
look to use short-term external environmental factors to
improve their mood, choosing to pursue immediate rewards to
the neglect of long-term benefits or costs. This decision-making
style is consistent with observations that depressed patients
may overeat, abuse substances, or shop excessively as efforts
at mood repair [11,12], despite the long-term negative
consequences of these behaviors. Patients with PTSD often
make choices demonstrating excessive concern about potential
threat and vulnerability, leading to behaviors that are avoidant
or that reflect marked fear and expectation of negative future
events, often experienced as a sense of dread.
Neuroimaging studies have identified alterations in the brains
of patients with MDD and PTSD. Structurally, both MDD and
PTSD patients demonstrate reduced volumes in anterior
cingulate cortex, hippocampus and thalamus relative to healthy
controls [13]. Findings present in MDD, but not PTSD, patients
include reduced orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) volume, while PTSD
patients show decreased inferior temporal cortex and
amygdala volumes more consistently than MDD patients
[14,15]. From functional imaging the most consistent finding in
MDD patients is heightened resting state activity compared to
controls in subgenual and pregenual anterior cingulate cortex
[16]. Hypoactivity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), a
region frequently implicated in executive control [17], is another
common finding [18]. In PTSD, the best replicated finding is
hyperactivation of the amygdala, a region implicated in fear
processing and salience detection [19,20], and reduced
activation of the medial PFC in response to potential threat
stimuli [21,22]. Experienced reward is processed via signaling
in the striatum, and hypoactivity in these regions compared to
controls have been reported for both MDD [23] and PTSD [24].
Several of these brain regions affected in MDD and PTSD
also serve as important processing areas within networks
associated with valuation and decision-making [25].
Intertemporal choice is one of the most ubiquitous forms of
decision making, the outcomes of which can significantly
impact individuals’ personal and professional success,
including their health and wealth [26]. Intertemporal decisions
involve temporally delayed consequences that involve tradeoffs
between immediate consumption and planning for a better
outcome. Temporal discounting (also known as delay
discounting) refers to the well-established tendency in animals
and humans to place less value on a reward or cost as the time
to receipt of that reward or cost moves further into the future
[27,28]. Delay discounting in psychiatrically healthy individuals
typically displays a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function,
showing steep declines in the perceived value of a reward in
the relatively near future, with a flattening of the decline over
more distant time periods [29]. Discounting for delayed losses
is usually less steep than for delayed gains [30,31], indicating
that for most people, large future losses are more aversive than
large future gains are attractive.
In psychiatry, greater discounting of future rewards has been
most consistently demonstrated for patients with addictive
disorders [32,33]. Whether the established clinical and
neurobiological differences between MDD and PTSD are
associated with differences in delay discounting has not been
determined. In a sample of healthy college students, higher
levels of self-reported anhedonic symptoms were correlated
with less steep discounting of future gains, suggesting that
non-clinical levels of anhedonia may be associated with greater
willingness to wait for a larger delayed reward compared to a
smaller reward received immediately [34]. In another study,
healthy subjects exposed to a tryptophan-depleted condition
(which results in lower availability of central nervous system
serotonin) more steeply discounted the value of future gains
than non-depleted subjects [35]. Only one prior published study
has examined temporal discounting in a clinical sample of
patients experiencing a current major depressive episode. In a
mixed sample of Japanese unipolar and bipolar depressed
patients, Takahashi and colleagues found depressed patients
discounted both future gains and future losses less steeply
than controls [36]. No previous work has examined these
decision-making variables in PTSD patients.
In the current study, we compared intertemporal decision-
making in healthy controls with subjects currently experiencing
a major depressive episode. Furthermore, we assessed
whether decision-making among MDD patients differed
between subjects for whom MDD was the primary illness
(MDD-only) versus those for whom MDD was secondary to a
primary diagnosis of PTSD (MDD+PTSD). Specifically, we
explored: 1) whether there are differences in risk-taking and
temporal discounting between depressed subjects and
psychiatrically healthy subjects; and 2) whether MDD-only
subjects differ in their choice behavior from MDD+PTSD
subjects in the context of choice scenarios probing risk and
intertemporal economic preferences. Because differences in
risk attitudes may affect intertemporal choice behavior [37,38],
these two components of decision-making should be
simultaneously assessed, though this has not been done in
previous studies of intertemporal choice in patients. We
expected depressed subjects to show greater risk-taking and
steeper temporal discounting curves than healthy control
participants. We also hypothesized that MDD+PTSD subjects
would show steeper temporal discounting for gains and losses
than pure MDD subjects.
Materials and Methods
Study Design
We used a case-control design to compare subjects with
depression and healthy, non-depressed control subjects on
factors related to decision-making. The Emory Institutional
Review Board reviewed and approved the study protocol. The
Loss and Decisions in Depression
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 October 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 10 | e78292
study was conducted in accord with the Declaration of Helsinki
and its amendments.
Participants
Participants were recruited from ongoing studies of MDD and
PTSD in the Mood and Anxiety Disorders Program of Emory
University and from flyers posted on the Emory University
campus. All subjects were English speakers between the ages
of 18-65 years and signed a written informed consent form to
participate.
To be eligible, depressed subjects had to meet criteria for
MDD and be in an active major depressive episode diagnosed
using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID) [39],
and score ≥18 on the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression
(HAM-D) for the past week, reflecting at least a moderate level
of depression severity [40]. Subjects with MDD were divided
into two subgroups: 1) those who had a primary diagnosis of
MDD and who did not meet criteria for PTSD were classified as
the MDD-only group; 2) those who met SCID criteria for PTSD,
and for whom PTSD was the primary diagnosis, were classified
as the MDD+PTSD group. Eligibility criteria for healthy controls
(HC) included an absence of any current Axis I psychiatric
disorder, absence of lifetime history of MDD, and a past-week
HAM-D score ≤7, the standard cut-point for that scale
representing minimal to absent depressive symptoms. All
participants had to report being free of psychotropic
medications, as well as herbal or other over-the-counter
preparations with psychotropic effects, for one week prior to
testing.
Exclusionary criteria for all subjects included a lifetime
diagnosis of bipolar disorder or a psychotic disorder, acute
clinically significant suicide risk, substance abuse or
dependence in the previous three months, or active central
nervous system-related illness that would affect ability to
complete the test procedures.
Measures
Anxiety was assessed with the Hamilton Anxiety Rating
Scale (HAM-A) [41]. Self-reported adverse childhood
experiences were measured with the Childhood Trauma
Questionnaire (CTQ) [42]. To assess personality factors related
to decision-making, two standard self-report questionnaires
were administered: the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale Version 11
(BIS), which determines an overall measure of impulsivity,
along with three factors: attentional, non-planning, and motor
impulsivity [43], and the Flinders Decision-Making
Questionnaire (FDMQ) [44], which provides data on four
different qualities of decision-making. These qualities include
Vigilance, which reflects a healthy, rational decision-making
style, along with Hypervigilance, Buck-passing and
Procrastination, which reflect maladaptive problem-solving
styles. See supplemental materials (Text S1 in File S1) for a
more detailed description of the BIS-11 and FDMQ.
Decision-making Tasks
After completion of the clinician interviews and self-report
questionnaires, subjects completed a series of standard
computerized decision-making tasks, using either points or
hypothetical monetary payouts as outcomes.
In the Risky Gains task [45], subjects make decisions about
whether to accept a smaller amount of points at no risk, or
whether to wait for increasing amounts, but at a higher risk.
The goal of this task is to collect as many points as possible.
Subjects view a series of increasing numbers (20, 40, 80),
which remain on screen for 1 second. Points can be collected
by accepting the number shown on the screen at a given
moment via button press. Accepting the 20-point option is
always a safe bet; however, waiting for higher value choice
options can lead to an immediate loss of all points on that trial
and therefore carries risk. Trials in which subjects can lose
points are referred to as “punished” trials. There are 96 trials
presented randomly (54 unpunished, 24 punished-40, 18
punished-80). The task assesses two behaviors related to the
relative frequency of risky choices (1) over all trials, reflective of
baseline risk attitude and (2) after punishment was received,
reflective of punishment sensitivity.
In the Delay Discounting Task [46], subjects are instructed to
make binary choices between smaller but sooner and later but
larger hypothetical monetary payouts (dollars). The subjects
make repeated choices (prefer immediate reward or delayed
future reward) for each of six future time points. For each time
point, a “delay equivalent” was determined using a standard
bisection method. Delay equivalents are the indifference points
between an immediate and delayed outcome and reflect the
subjective value that subjects place on an outcome that occurs
in the future. The bisection method followed the following
algorithm: For each delay, there were eight choice trials, in
which the future reward amount was fixed, and the amount of
the immediate reward was varied. Amounts of immediate gains
for a given delayed choice option were adjusted based on
subjects’ prior choices, such that the immediate gain
magnitude offered on the current trial was increased by
stepsize δ when the subject chose the delayed amount on the
prior trial and decreased by δ when the immediate gain was
chosen. Specifically, the range between 0 and the fixed
delayed reward value was divided into thirds. The one-third and
two-third cut point amounts were presented as the immediate
reward option on the first two choice trials. This procedure
identified which third of the range would be used in the
subsequent choice trials for that time point. The magnitude of
the adjustment parameter, δ, was decreased on each trial until
a best estimate of the decision equivalent was reached after 8
trials (see 43 for a similar procedure over risky choice options).
This procedure was repeated for each of six delayed gains,
with delay d, in days, months, or years and a fixed gain
amount, x in dollars, which consisted of (d, x) = (5y, 10360),
(30d, 10260), (10y, 9740), (3y, 9880), (1y, 9640), (6m, 10120).
The reward amount, x, was varied slightly to avoid stereotyped
responding. The task was repeated with equivalent parameters
for losses, such that subjects chose whether they preferred an
immediate loss now, or a future greater loss. The following six
delayed losses were included (d, x) = (6m, 9740), (6y, 9880),
(30d, 9640), (5y, 10120), (10y, 10360), (1y, 10260).
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Statistical Analysis
Initial analyses compared responses of HC and the
depressed groups to assess questionnaire and behavioral
differences between the two groups. In a pre-planned analysis,
we repeated all comparisons using the three groups (HC,
MDD-only, and MDD+PTSD) to examine the moderating
effects of primary PTSD within the depressed group. For the
risky gains task, the percentage of risky choices overall and
after punishment was compared across subject groups using
nonparametric tests. Specifically, for comparisons of two
groups, the two-sample Wilcoxon test was employed, while for
comparisons of three groups, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used
for initial group comparisons and, if significant differences were
identified, follow-up analyses were conducted using the two-
sample Wilcoxon test. Repeating all non-parametric analyses
using the equivalent parametric approach (one-way between-
subjects ANOVA and independent samples t-test) identified the
same trends.
For the Delay Discounting task, subjective values reflective
of the indifference point between the choice options offering
immediate and delayed rewards were entered as response
variables into a standard econometric model [47,48].
Specifically, a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function was fit to
the data to assess the influence of framing (gain vs. loss) and
group on discounting slopes for choice options in the near and
distant future. The quasi-hyperbolic model was selected via a
rigorous model selection procedure, in which we compared
three standard discounting functions commonly employed to
model intertemporal choice behavior, namely full and reduced
forms of an exponential, a hyperbolic, and a quasi-hyperbolic
model. We performed model selection on the aggregate data
(see Text S2 in File S1 for a detailed description of the model
selection procedure and Tables S1 and S2 in File S1 for
results), as well as on each group (see Tables S3-S6 in File S1
for results). In both cases the reduced quasi-hyperbolic model
was clearly superior. See supplemental materials (Text S2 in
File S1) for model selection results and detailed description of
the selected models.
Non-linear least squares regression implemented in R (http://
cran.us.r-project.org) was employed to assess differences in
temporal discounting slopes for gains and losses as a function
of group. The use of a quasi-hyperbolic model allowed us to
estimate group-specific parameters reflective of discounting
slopes for early (β, delays < 1) and late (δ, delays of >1-10)
choice options as well as for gains and losses. Our model
extracted parameters for representative subjects that were
clustered based on their diagnosis. Using aggregate data to
estimate behavioral parameters based on choices in economic
games and choice tasks is a standard econometric approach in
behavioral economics as well as neuroeconomics [49-52]. We
conducted nonparametric bootstrap analyses on parameter
estimates from our best fitting model using the boot package
implemented in R (N=35, resampling with replacement, ca.
25,000 replications) [53]. Because our aggregate model pools
data from various subjects with the same diagnosis, resampling
was stratified based on subject to correct for non-
independence of choices. Bias-corrected and accelerated two-
tailed 95% confidence intervals for parameter estimates were
calculated.
Results
Thirty-six participants consented to participate in the study:
20 depressed subjects (MDD-only=11, MDD+PTSD=9) and 16
HC. Data from one HC could not be extracted and was
excluded from the Delay Discounting Task analysis.
Demographic data for the sample are presented in Table 1.
Minorities (7 African-American, 2 Asian, and 6 multiracial)
comprised 42% of the sample. There were no significant
differences found between the HC and depressed groups for
any of the demographic variables.
Table 1 also presents the differences between the depressed
and HC participants on the depression, anxiety and childhood
trauma measures. As expected, depression severity as
assessed by HAM-D scores was significantly lower in HC than
in the depressed subjects; depression severity was similar
between the MDD-only and MDD+PTSD groups. MDD+PTSD
subjects were significantly more anxious than MDD-only
subjects. Both MDD-only and MDD+PTSD subjects were
significantly more likely to have suffered childhood trauma than
HC subjects based on the CTQ total score, and MDD+PTSD
subjects reported significantly more childhood trauma than
MDD-only subjects.
Risky Gains Task
As shown in Figure 1, depressed subjects did not make
riskier choices (i.e., choosing the “risky” 40 or 80 point value
versus the “safe” 20 point value) than HC [W = 134.5, p =
0.426, r = 0.135]. Depressed and HC subjects also showed no
significant difference in whether they chose a “safe” 20 point
option or a “risky” 40 or 80 point option after a round in which
they were punished and lost points [W = 122, p = 0.233, r =
0.202]. The three-group analysis reproduced the results from
the two-group analysis (Figure S1 in File S1). Specifically, risky
choice behavior did not differ between the HC, MDD-only and
MDD+PTSD groups [Safe choice: X2 (df = 2, N = 36) = 2.2973,
p = 0.3171; or safe choice after punishment: X2 (df = 2, N = 36)
= 1.731, p = 0.421]. These results indicate that the presence of
depression (with or without PTSD) did not differentially impact
choice frequencies over options involving risks over
hypothetical outcomes.
Temporal Discounting Task
General effects of depression on intertemporal decision-
making.  Figure 2A illustrates the results from the best-fitting 6-
parameter quasi-hyperbolic model employed to examine
general effects of depression on intertemporal decision-
making. Table 2 shows parameter estimates for depressed and
healthy control groups that reflect slopes for early discounting
for delays up to 1 year (β), and late discounting for both gains
(δ) and losses (δ * l) for delays greater than 1 year. Of greatest
significance to the current analyses are parameter estimates
reflective of comparisons between the depressed and healthy
control groups, including group effects on (1) early discounting
(β * g), (2) late discounting over gains (δ * g) and (3) late
Loss and Decisions in Depression
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discounting over losses (δ * g * l). As illustrated in Figure 2A,
depressed subjects show significantly steeper discounting for
gains than HC. This pattern was observed for early delays (β *
g: parameter estimate: 0.876, p < 0.005), as well as late delays
over gains (δ * g: parameter estimate: 0.054, p < 0.005). No
significant differences were observed for discounting over long
delays for losses. Taken together, these results indicate that
subjects in a current major depressive episode more steeply
discount gains over time than HC.
Moderating effects of PTSD on intertemporal decision-
making in depressed subjects.  Figures 2B and 2C illustrate
the moderating effect of PTSD within depressed subjects on
intertemporal choice, based on the best-fitting 9-parameter
model comparing the three groups. Table 3 shows parameter
estimates for individual groups that reflect slopes for early
discounting for delays up to 1 year (β), and late discounting for
both gains (δ) and losses (δ * l) for delays greater than 1 year.
Of greatest significance to the current analyses are parameter
estimates reflective of comparisons between the depressed
and healthy control groups, including group effects on (1) early
discounting (β * g), (2) late discounting over gains (δ * g) and
(3) late discounting over losses (δ * g * l). Quasi-hyperbolic
discounting functions for all groups are illustrated in Figure 2B,
while discounting functions together with mean delay
equivalents from the bisection method for individual groups are
shown in Figure 2C and 2D. Overall, results indicate that PTSD
Table 1. Demographic and clinical characteristics of depressed and healthy control subjects.
Characteristic HC (N=16) Depressed (N=20) p-value Pair-wise Comparison p-value
AGE, mean (SD), y 35.1 (16.0) 38.6 (12.6) 0.202 N/A N/A
GENDER   0.647 " "
Female (%) 12 (75) 15 (75)  " "
Male (%) 4 (25) 5 (25)  " "
RACE   0.214 " "
Caucasian (%) 11 (69) 10 (50)  " "
African-American (%) 1 (6) 6 (30)  " "
Asian (%) 2 (13) 0 (0)  " "
Multiracial (%) 2 (13) 4 (20)  " "
INCOME   0.525 " "
<$20k (%) 6 (38) 5 (25)  " "
$20-40k (%) 3 (19) 7 (35)  " "
>$40k (%) 6 (38) 8 (40)  " "
Unknown 1 (6) 0 (0)  " "
EDUCATION   0.101 " "
<=12 yrs (%) 0 (0) 4 (20)  " "
 13-16 yrs (%) 10 (63) 8 (40)  " "
>16 yrs (%) 6 (38) 6 (30)  " "
Unknown 0 (0) 2 (10)  " "
EMPLOYMENT   0.122 " "
Employed (%) 14 (88) 13 (65)  " "
Unemployed (%) 2 (13) 7 (35)  " "
HISTORY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE   0.306 " "
Yes (%) 2 (13) 5 (25)  " "
No (%) 14 (88) 15 (75)  " "
HAM-D, 1.19 (1.38) All MDD: 21.2 (2.5) <.001   
mean (SD)  MDD-only:21.6 (2.8)  MDD-only vs HC <.001
  MDD+PTSD:20.8 (2.3)  MDD+PTSD vs HC <.001
    MDD-only vs MDD+PTSD 0.673
HAM-A, 2.06 (2.27) All MDD: 17.7 (5.6) <.001   
mean (SD)  MDD-only:14.7 (5.2)  MDD-only vs HC <.001
  MDD+PTSD:21.8 (3.0)  MDD+PTSD vs HC <.001
    MDD-only vs MDD+PTSD 0.002
CTQ, 40.4 (9.5) All MDD: 69.0 (23.6) <.001   
mean (SD)  MDD-only:57.7 (10.8)  MDD-only vs HC <.001
  MDD+PTSD:82.8 (28.1)  MDD+PTSD vs HC <.001
    MDD-only vs MDD+PTSD 0.033
CTQ: Childhood trauma questionnaire; HAM-A: Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale; HAM-D: Hamilton Depression Rating Scale; HC: Healthy control; MDD-only: Major
depressive disorder; MDD+PTSD: Primary posttraumatic stress disorder comorbid with major depressive disorder
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0078292.t001
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functions as a moderating factor within depressed subjects,
such that a PTSD diagnosis is associated with a significant
change in temporal discounting over long term losses relative
to MDD-only subjects.
Specifically, the groups demonstrate different early
discounting slopes as indicated by the significant interaction
term β * g, such that MDD-only and MDD+PTSD subjects show
steeper slopes than HC reflective of greater temporal
discounting for both gain and loss choice options in the
immediate future (for D ≤1 year; HC vs. MDD-only: p < 0.05,
HC vs. MDD+PTSD: p < 0.05). For intertemporal choices
involving potential gains over delays of >1-10 years, MDD-only
and MDD+PTSD subjects continue to show significantly
steeper slopes than HC as indicated by the significant
interaction term (δ* g, for D >1 year; HC vs. MDD-only: p <
0.05, HC vs. MDD+PTSD: p < 0.05). These results indicate that
both depressed groups value long-term future rewards
significantly less relative to immediate outcomes than HC. In
the domain of losses, MDD-only subjects do not adjust their
discounting functions like the other two groups (difference
between gain and losses in HC: p < 0.001, in MDD+PTSD: p =
0.009), indicating that, compared to MDD+PTSD subjects and
HC, MDD-only subjects have greater preference for larger later
losses over smaller immediate losses. Importantly, choice
patterns of MDD+PTSD subjects differ significantly from the
other two groups in that they show a significantly greater
change from short- to long-term outcomes as indicated by the
significant interaction term (δ* g * l). Specifically, while choice
patterns of MDD+PTSD subjects are similar to MDD-only
subjects for outcomes after short-delays and gains after >1-10
year delays, their choice patterns look more like HC for losses
over the >1-10 year delay period. These results indicate that
the effect of loss framing was greatest on choice patterns of
MDD+PTSD subjects relative to the MDD-only and HC (HC vs.
MDD+PTSD: p < 0.05, MDD-only vs MDD+PTSD: p < 0.05).
Decision-making Questionnaires
Table 4 summarizes the results of the BIS and FDMQ
questionnaires. Depressed subjects reported significantly more
overall impulsivity than HC subjects, as well as Attentional and
Non-Planning impulsivity factors. There were no differences
between MDD-only and MDD+PTSD subjects on any
impulsivity measure.
On the FDMQ, depressed subjects scored higher than HC on
Hypervigilance, Procrastination and Buck-Passing factors. HC
scored significantly higher than depressed subjects on
Vigilance. Post hoc testing of Vigilance scores did not find
differences between MDD-only and HC, but MDD+PTSD
subjects were significantly lower than HC.
Discussion
In this study of subjects in a current major depressive
episode and HC subjects, we found substantial differences in
temporal discounting between healthy and depressed subjects.
Furthermore, the effect of PTSD modified the discounting for
losses observed among subjects in a current major depressive
episode. These differences in discounting did not derive from
Figure 1.  Group differences in choice frequencies during risky decision-making.  HC: Healthy controls; MDD: Major
depressive disorder.
Notched box plots illustrate choice frequencies as a function of group (all MDD and HC). Notches reflect confidence intervals around
the median (median +/- (1.57 x IQR/√n), and, in case of no overlap, indicate significant differences between medians. No differences
between all MDD and HC were observed for median choice frequencies over the safe option (20 points) overall, as well as
immediately following a punished trial.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0078292.g001
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different risk attitudes, as we observed no differences between
the groups on the level of risk taking, nor in the sensitivity to
punishment on the Risky Gains Task.
The most intriguing result of this study was the dissociation
between depressed subjects with and without PTSD in the area
of long-term (>1 year) discounting of losses. Both groups
showed the expected steep discounting for gains in both short-
term and long-term time frames, indicating a greater preference
than controls to take smaller immediate outcomes rather than
await a later, larger gain. In the domain of losses, however,
significant differences between the depressed groups were
observed. Although both groups of depressed subjects showed
steeper discounting than healthy subjects for losses delayed up
to a year, PTSD subjects demonstrate a stark and significant
recovery from steep discounting for loss outcomes beyond one
year. This finding was contrary to our hypothesis that the PTSD
symptom of a foreshortened future would drive steeper
discounting over both losses and gains.
The shallower discounting of future losses in the healthy
controls and MDD+PTSD versus the MDD-only group suggests
the MDD-only group did not experience disutility in dreading a
known long-term loss, which others have observed in healthy
subjects [54]. The MDD-only subjects clearly preferred to
accept a larger later loss to avoid immediate losses, perhaps
stemming from profound pessimism about the future.
Alternatively, the aversion of experiencing an immediate loss
relative to that of a delayed loss may have been exacerbated
by the presence of an already aversive mood state. According
to this hypothesis, current depressed mood state creates an
affective context that leads to choice distortions relative to
Figure 2.  Quasi-hyperbolic discounting functions across groups.  HC: Healthy controls; MDD-only: Major depressive disorder
without PTSD; MDD+PTSD: Primary posttraumatic stress disorder comorbid with major depressive disorder.Temporal discounting
reflects a decrease in subjective value as the time to the outcome increases. Subjective value is shown in all figures as a fraction of
the immediate outcome. (A) Steeper discounting slopes for all MDD subjects relative to HC were found for short-term and long-term
gains, but not for long-term losses. (B) PTSD significantly modulates temporal discounting over long-term losses, as demonstrated
via significant differences in the slope for later losses between MDD only and MDD+PTSD subjects. (C) To illustrate model fits for
each group, quasi-hyperbolic discounting functions are shown for each group separately together with means of subjective values
obtained from the bisection method.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0078292.g002
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healthy controls and MDD+PTSD subjects, who both preferred
to take a smaller loss now rather than incur a larger later loss.
This willingness of MDD+PTSD subjects to accept an
immediate loss to avoid a larger later one may reflect an
anxious attitude about negative future events. For example,
victims of domestic violence who have PTSD often continue to
live with their abusers for years before moving out to a shelter
or some other source of refuge. Although many practical
aspects may affect such decision-making, one
conceptualization consistent with this study’s findings is that
accepting the pain of physical abuse now is more acceptable to
depressed PTSD patients than larger perceived long-term
losses incurred from being dispossessed of one’s home and
belongings. It is also possible that the disutility associated with
dreading a long-term high cost is greater for anxiously
depressed PTSD patients than MDD patients without PTSD.
Interestingly, the negative experience of dread of future pain is
processed partly through the anterior cingulate cortex [54], a
region showing hypofunction in PTSD patients exposed to
threat.
The finding of reduced discounting of losses over the >1-10
year frame suggests that the presence of anxiety associated
with PTSD in the setting of a major depressive episode may
serve protective functions against overly pessimistic-based
choices in MDD-only subjects. Although the presence of
anxiety in patients suffering from MDD predicts poor response
to antidepressant treatments in terms of symptom reduction
[55], real-world decision-making may be improved by this
countervailing force. Further research on discounting in
patients with anxiety disorders without MDD, and in MDD
patients with other anxiety disorders (particularly generalized
anxiety disorder) are needed to clarify this potentially protective
role of anxiety.
Together, these results inform future research investigating
the underlying affective and cognitive processes, as well as
related neural mechanisms, of the observed choice distortions
in patients with MDD. Research in neuroeconomics has made
considerable progress in identifying the neural mechanisms
involved in intertemporal decision-making. From a number of
recent studies it has become apparent that intertemporal
choice is a complex behavior that engages multiple affective
and cognitive processes that are mediated by distinct but
interacting neural networks [29,47,56-61]. These processes
include: (1) choice conflict, which requires a resolution of
conflict between two or more competing choice options to
compute a decision. Choice conflict has repeatedly been
associated with activity in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) [62];
(2) valuation, which informs choice conflict by assigning
subjective value to different choice options. A large body of
evidence implicates two highly interconnected brain areas,
namely the ventral striatum (VS) and ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC) in value computations [63]; (3) self-control,
which needs to be engaged in situations in which subjective
valuation alone leads to an outcome that is in conflict with long-
term goals in order to ensure optimal decision-making. Two
recent studies have implicated the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (dlPFC) in self-control during intertemporal choice
[59,60]; and (4) prospection, which is the ability to engage in
Table 2. Comparison between all depressed (MDD-only and MDD+PTSD) and healthy control (HC) subjects.
Parameters Estimate (bias) SEM t p 95% CI boot
     Lower Limit Upper Limit
Early Discounting (β)
HC 0.664 (0.007) 0.147 4.939 < 0.001 0.4133 0.9922
MDD 1.540 (-0.049) 0.372 6.148 < 0.001 1.074 2.479
Group differences in early discounting (β* g)
HC vs. MDD 0.876 (0.048) 0.398 3.081 0.002 0.3018 1.7999
Late Discounting over gains (δ)
HC -0.012 (0.001) 0.012 -1.155 0.249 -0.0338 0.0126
MDD 0.042 (0.001) 0.013 2.999 0.003 0.0165 0.0681
Late Discounting over losses (δ* l)
HC -0.022 (-0.000) 0.014 -1.739 0.083 -0.0501 0.0044
MDD -0.046 (-0.000) 0.016 -2.798 0.005 -0.0773 -0.0138
Group differences in late discounting over gains (δ* g)
HC vs. MDD 0.054 (-0.000) 0.018 3.088 0.002 0.0187 0.0883
Group differences in late discounting over losses (δ* g* l)
HC vs. MDD -0.023 (0.000) 0.021 -1.123 0.262 -0.0648 0.0181
Results from the best fitting quasi-hyperbolic model and bootstrap analysis showing parameter estimates for each group and group differences in early and late discounting
over gains and losses.
β: early discounting, δ: late discounting, g: effect of group on discounting slope, l: effect of loss on discounting slope. Parameter estimates are shown together with their
estimated bias based on bootstrap analyses (in parentheses), respective standard errors (SEM), t statistic, p values, and 95% confidence intervals from confirmatory
nonparametric bootstrap analyses.
Parameter estimates reflect quasi-hyperbolic intertemporal choice functions for each group (β, δ and, δ * l). Interactions with the group dummy (g) reflect differences in
slopes between groups for delays smaller than one year (β* g), as well as delays greater than one year in the domain of gains (δ* g) and losses (δ* g * l).
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0078292.t002
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episodic future thought and is required to form mental
representations of future goals. A recent study demonstrated
that the ability to engage in prospection significantly modulated
impulsivity during intertemporal choice, which was associated
with strengthened functional connectivity between ACC and
hippocampus [61].
The choice distortions observed in patients with MDD in the
current investigation are likely due to changes in multiple
interacting brain systems. Primary among those are systems
known to be altered by depression and anxiety, including (1)
valuation, which is expected to be particularly distorted in the
presence of anhedonia, a common sympton of MDD; (2) choice
conflict, which is expected to be biased in the presence of
anxiety about aversive events in the future, a common
symptom in PTSD; and (3) the ability to simulate future
outcomes, which our results suggest to be attenuated in
patients with MDD only. Interestingly, the functional
connectivity between ACC and hippocampus has been
associated with reductions in impulsive intertemporal decision-
making [61], both of which are regions whose structural and
functional integrity is affected by MDD.
Some have argued that intertemporal choice behavior may
be confounded by risk attitude because delays entail an
inherent risk that the future event may never occur [37,63].
Furthermore, the processing of decisions involving risk and
delayed consequences engages partially overlapping brain
networks, including DLPFC, OFC, ventral striatum and anterior
insula [49,64-67]. It is therefore important to note that we did
not find significant differences between depressed and HC
groups in their propensity to take risks. These results indicate
that, against concerns raised by economists, our current
findings on intertemporal decision-making are likely not driven
by group differences in risk attitudes. Future investigations of
risk between depressed and control subjects should identify the
underlying mechanisms leading to the observed differences.
Such investigations may benefit from using more established
neuroeconomic probes of risk attitude, which typically sample
Table 3. Comparison between depressed subjects with MDD only, versus those with primary PTSD and comorbid MDDand
healthy controls (HC).
Parameters Estimate SEM t p 95% CI boot
 (bias)    Lower Limit Upper Limit
Early Discounting (β)      
HC 0.664 (0.007) 0.134 4.974 <0.001 0.4101 0.9967
MDD only 1.370 (0.053) 0.297 4.613 <0.001 0.862 2.374
MDD + PTSD 1.800 (0.498) 0.442 4.072 <0.001 1.002 8.652
Group differences in early discounting (β* g)    
HC vs. MDD only 0.706 (0.005) 0.326 2.168 0.031 0.1028 1.6968
HC vs. MDD + PTSD 1.136 (0.490) 0.462 2.460 0.014 0.265 8.065
MDD only vs. MDD + PTSD 0.430 (0.445) 0.533 0.807 0.420 -0.7816 7.0652
Late Discounting over gains (δ)     
HC -0.012 (0.001) 0.013 1.752 0.081 -0.0336 0.0123
MDD only 0.030 (0.001) 0.022 0.507 0.612 0.0006 0.0632
MDD + PTSD 0.057 (0.002) 0.025 3.332 <0.001 0.0126 0.1034
Late Discounting over losses (δ* l)    
HC -0.034 (-0.001) 0.008 -4.431 <0.001 -0.0502 0.004
MDD only 0.019 (-0.000) 0.014 1.369 0.172 -0.0558 0.0352
MDD + PTSD -0.027 (-0.002) 0.011 -2.613 0.009 -0.1326 -0.0353
Group differences in late discounting over gains (δ* g)   
HC vs. MDD only 0.042 (-0.0002) 0.020 2.132 0.034 0.0035 0.0817
HC vs. MDD + PTSD 0.069 (0.0005) 0.025 2.726 0.007 0.0194 0.1233
MDD only vs. MDD + PTSD 0.027 (0.0007) 0.029 0.932 0.352 -0.0285 0.0835
Group differences in late discounting over losses (δ* g* l)   
HC vs. MDD only 0.011 (0.0005) 0.025 0.441 0.659 -0.0417 0.0652
HC vs. MDD + PTSD -0.062 (-0.001) 0.028 -2.191 0.029 -0.1179 -0.0069
MDD only vs. MDD + PTSD -0.073 (0.001) 0.034 -2.189 0.029 -0.1400 -0.0071
Results from best fitting quasi-hyperbolic model and bootstrap analysis showing parameter estimates for each group and group differences in early and late discounting over
gains and losses.
β: early discounting, δ: late discounting, g: effect of group on discounting slope, l: effect of loss on discounting slope. Parameter estimates are shown together with their
estimated bias based on bootstrap analyses (in brackets), respective standard errors (SEM), t statistic, p values, and 95% confidence intervals from confirmatory
nonparametric bootstrap analyses.
Parameter estimates reflect quasi-hyperbolic intertemporal choice functions for each group (β, δ and, δ * l). Interactions with the group dummy (g) reflect differences in
slopes between groups for delays smaller than one year (β* g), as well as delays greater than one year in the domain of gains (δ* g) and losses (δ* g * l).
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0078292.t003
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from a more extensive decision-space over multiple
probabilities and payout magnitudes.
Our results both agree and conflict with the only prior study
of intertemporal choice in depressed patients. Consistent with
our results, Takahashi and colleagues [36] reported greater
levels of impulsivity for near-future outcomes in depressed
compared to healthy subjects, as well as similar discounting of
distant-future gains and losses in depressed subjects.
Importantly, their depressed patients showed almost no
discounting of losses in the distant future, an effect that in our
investigation was significantly modulated by the presence of
PTSD. Despite the similar results for depressed subjects
across the two investigations, we observe different choice
patterns for long-term gains and losses in our healthy control
subjects. Specifically, contrary to results from Takahashi and
colleagues, healthy controls in our investigation showed
minimal discounting of long-term future gains and losses.
Potential contributors to the differing results include the
differing intertemporal choice tasks and econometric models
used, as well as the participant’s culture (Western versus
Japanese), which can have a significant impact on decision-
relevant neural and cognitive mechanisms [68].
A potential limitation of this study is the use of hypothetical
rewards. Specifically, artificial reward “points” formed the basis
of motivation in both the Risky Gains and the Temporal
Discounting tasks. Although real payoffs may increase salience
and more strongly engage anticipatory emotions in decision-
making, previous work suggests the use of hypothetical
rewards does not lead to meaningfully different choices from
those involving real outcomes [69,70]. Strengths of the study
include the well-matched groups, and that all depressed
subjects were suffering from moderate to severe depression,
so failure to identify disturbances due to mild symptoms was
avoided.
The results of the present study suggest that there are
significant differences between healthy subjects and depressed
patients in the way they make intertemporal decisions.
Intertemporal decisions are ubiquitous in real life and have
Table 4. Depressed versus healthy control subjects self-reported impulsivity and decision-making styles.
Characteristic HC (N=16) Depressed (N=20) p-value Pair-wise Comparison p-value
BIS      
Total, 49.2 (7.0) All MDD: 64.5 (14.2) 0.001   
mean (SD)  MDD-only: 63.0 (12.0)  MDD-only vs HC 0.004
  MDD+PTSD: 66.3 (16.5)  MDD+PTSD vs HC 0.008
    MDD-only vs MDD+PTSD 0.518
Attentional Impulsivity, 12.4 (2.3) All MDD: 17.4 (4.9) 0.001   
mean (SD)  MDD-only: 16.8 (3.3)  MDD-only vs HC 0.001
  MDD+PTSD: 18.0 (6.5)  MDD+PTSD vs HC 0.021
    MDD-only vs MDD+PTSD 0.878
Motor Impulsivity, mean (SD) 18.9 (2.5) All MDD: 21.2 (5.6) 0.345 N/A N/A
Non-Planning Impulsivity, 17.8 (4.1) All MDD: 26.0 (5.9) <.001   
mean (SD)  MDD-only: 25.7 (5.6)  MDD-only vs HC 0.003
  MDD+PTSD: 26.2 (6.6)  MDD+PTSD vs HC 0.004
    MDD-only vs MDD+PTSD 0.939
FDMQ      
Vigilance, 11.1 (1.5) All MDD: 10.6 (2.2) 0.021   
mean (SD)  MDD-only: 9.9 (2.2)  MDD-only vs HC 0.102
  MDD+PTSD: 9.1 (2.3)  MDD+PTSD vs HC 0.021
    MDD-only vs MDD+PTSD 0.437
Hypervigilance, 2.2 (1.6) All MDD: 5.5 (1.9) <.001   
mean (SD)  MDD-only: 5.3 (1.8)  MDD-only vs HC 0.001
  MDD+PTSD: 5.7 (2.0)  MDD+PTSD vs HC 0.001
    MDD-only vs MDD+PTSD 0.562
Buck-Passing, 2.8 (2.5) All MDD: 6.4 (3.8) 0.008   
mean (SD)  MDD-only: 6.0 (3.7)  MDD-only vs HC 0.036
  MDD+PTSD: 6.8 (4.0)  MDD+PTSD vs HC 0.019
    MDD-only vs MDD+PTSD 0.619
Procrastination, 1.8 (1.4) All MDD: 5.4 (2.6) <.001   
mean (SD)  MDD-only: 5.6 (2.7)  MDD-only vs HC <.001
  MDD+PTSD: 5.0 (2.6)  MDD+PTSD vs HC 0.002
    MDD-only vs MDD+PTSD 0.513
BIS: Barratt Impulsivity Scale; HC: Healthy control; FDMQ: Flinders Decision-Making Questionnaire; MDD-only: Major depressive disorder; MDD+PTSD: Primary
posttraumatic stress disorder comorbid with major depressive disorder
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0078292.t004
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been shown to significantly impact important facets of life, such
as relationships, physical health and wealth [26]. The observed
behavioral differences therefore may have important
implications for treatment. For example, specific components of
psychotherapeutic approaches for patients with major
depression may benefit from modifications based on the
degree to which a patient discounts future outcomes. Delay
discounting tasks may have particular value in research on
suicide, in that patients who most steeply discount future
outcomes may be at heightened suicide risk. Coupling real-
world choice behaviors by patients, such as credit card
spending and saving habits, with laboratory measures of
decision-making are needed to determine the clinical value of
this line of research.
Finally, the differences we identified in choice behavior
between depressed subjects with a primary diagnosis of PTSD
versus those MDD subjects without PTSD suggest changes in
the underlying neurobiological mechanisms involved in
intertemporal choice [61]. Key networks that are likely to impact
decision-making and have been shown to be affected by PTSD
include the amygdala - prefrontal circuitry [22]. Future
neuroimaging research is required to test the extent to which
brain networks implicated in computations of important decision
parameters are affected by the presence of MDD and PTSD.
Conclusion
Employing (neuro-)economic decision-making paradigms to
investigate choice distortions in patients with psychiatric
disorders can convey important insights into clinical features of
mood and anxiety disorders. Anxiety or dread may lead
depressed patients with a primary diagnosis of PTSD to make
more conservative decisions about long-term losses that
provide partial protection from negative consequences derived
from the short-term outlook that drives decision-making among
other patients with MDD.
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